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Consider the implications in each of these vignettes drawn from our
nation's history:
The Barbary Pirates. In the summer of 1801, newly-inaugurated President
Thomas Jefferson learned that a declaration of war had been issued against
the United States by Tripoli, one of the four kingdoms of the Barbary Coast.
Congress was not in session and was not scheduled to reconvene for several
months. Jefferson was acutely aware that only the Congress had the power to
declare war. What to do?
Jefferson was already familiar with the Barbary situation. For centuries,
these states had been running a "protection racket" of sorts against the Euro-
pean nations whose ships plied the Mediterranean's waters: capturing ships,
enslaving seamen or holding them for ransom, and exacting tribute from
European governments in return for a promise to refrain from such harass-
ment. After United States independence, its ships no longer enjoyed British
protection and several were captured. As United States ambassador to France
during the 1780s, Jefferson tried unsuccessfully to secure the release of the
crewmen of those ships. Moreover, he attempted to organize a multilateral
naval force to police the Mediterranean from such piracy, but to no avail.
Having no alternative, the United States thus followed European practice and
negotiated treaties with the four Barbary states calling for annual tributary
payments.
When Tripoli declared war on the United States, in hope of a higher rate
of payment, President Jefferson decided that the United States had had
enough. He dispatched four ships of the United States Navy to protect
American shipping in the area, but-in the absence of any congressional
authorization-ordered them to take only defensive measures. When Con-
gress reconvened that fall, he asked for specific authority to prosecute the war
more vigorously, which he promptly received. The combined action of the
United States Navy and Marines forced Tripoli to sue for peace in 1805, and
by 1830, the Barbary pirates had been driven from the sea.1
* Professor of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The
author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Richard Huff.
1. See G. TUCKER, DAWN LIKE THUNDER: THE BARBARY WARS AND THE BIRTH OF THE U.S.
NAVY passim (1963).
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War with Mexico. No President added more territory to the United States than
James K. Polk. A firm believer in United States expansionism, he tapped la-
tent sources of power within the presidency to achieve his territorial goals,
powers that had previously remained untouched-most notably the Presi-
dent's control over the deployment and stationing of United States troops.
In 1845, the United States annexed Texas, despite the strong opposition
of Mexico, which had never conceded the independence of its breakaway
province. To protect this new acquisition, Polk sent United States troops to
defend Texas against a potential Mexican invasion. But the border was ill-
defined, and as the United States troops advanced into the disputed area,
Mexico attempted to repel this alleged invasion of its territory. Polk then used
this attack as a pretext for a congressional declaration of war, which he was
speedily granted. But many members of Congress were aghast at what they
saw as a presidential usurpation of the warmaking power. Former President
John Quincy Adams, then a member of the House of Representatives, fumed
that Polk's actions had created "an irreversible precedent ... that the Presi-
dent of the United States has but to declare that War exists, with any Nation
upon Earth, . . .and the War is essentially declared." Adams's colleague, Rep-
resentative Abraham Lincoln, held similar views: "Allow the President to in-
vade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an
invasion ...and you allow him to make war at pleasure. "2
The Cuban Missile Crisis. For thirteen days in October 1962, the United States
and the Soviet Union stood "eyeball to eyeball," each with the power of
mutual annihilation in hand. The United States was firm but forebearing.
The Soviet Union looked hard, blinked twice, and then withdrew without
humiliation.
Lincoln had written that "no one man" should have the power to involve
the nation in war. Yet in the missile crisis, with the nation on the brink of the
most destructive war in history, one man did wield that power, perhaps neces-
sarily so. The demands of the missile crisis-the need for unity, secrecy, flexi-
bility, and dispatch-made congressional consultation impractical. There was
time for Congress to pass a resolution authorizing or endorsing whatever ac-
tions Kennedy felt necessary to take. Indeed, Congress only two weeks earlier
had enacted the Cuban Resolution of' 1962, expressing "the determination of
the United States to prevent the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba, by what-
ever means may be necessary, including the use of force of arms, from ex-
tending its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of the Hemisphere,"
and "to prevent the creation of an externally supported military capability
there endangering United States security. '3 But there could be only one hand
2. A. SCHLESINGER. JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 41-42 (1973).
3 Act of Oct 3 1962. Pub. L. No. 87-733, 76 Stat. 697.
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on the nuclear trigger. In this instance, command authority over United
States forces and decision authority for war or peace were inseparable.
Yet Kennedy did not make his decisions alone. His "ExCom,' 4 the group
which advised him during the crisis, represented one of the most impressive
collections of experience, wisdom, and expertise ever assembled in the White
House. No members of Congress were included in the ExCom nor were even
asked for their advice. Is it likely that they could have improved upon the
array of options presented to the President, options ranging from doing
nothing at all to an invasion of Cuba? Could the presence of a few individual
members of Congress have conferred the institutional approval of that body
upon the President's decision? Although the Constitution assigned to Con-
gress the authority to declare war, technology and time have, it appears,
amended the Constitution. Kennedy's ExCom served as a partial equivalent of
the constitutional intent.
Vietnam. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has written:5
Kennedy's action [in the missile crisis], which should have been celebrated as
an exception, was instead enshrined as a rule. . . .The very brilliance of
Kennedy's performance appeared to vindicate the idea that the President
must take unto himself the final judgments of war and peace .... But one of
its legacies was the imperial conception of the Presidency that brought the
Republic so low in Vietnam.
After a Viet Cong assault on a United States base at Pleiku on February 9,
1965, President Johnson ordered the initiation of regular air strikes against
North Vietnam, the beginning of the most intensive aerial bombardment in
history. One month later, the first United States combat troops landed in the
South, and the country's longest war-already four years old by official
estimate-had entered its costliest and bloodiest phase.
Who authorized this undertaking? President Johnson claimed that the re-
sponsibility was his alone. The previous August, Congress had passed the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, in which it declared its support for "the determina-
tion of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures
to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to pre-
vent further aggression. ' 6 Yet Congress, Johnson claimed, was not delegating
its authority in the Resolution, but merely approving the President's actions.
"We stated then," he said in 1967, "and we repeat now, we did not think the
resolution was necessary to do what we did and what we're doing. ' 7 Nor did
his successor. Presidential war reached its zenith during the administration of
4. Executive Committee of the National Security Council.
5. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 2, at 176.
6. Act of Aug. 10, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384. See also H.R.J. Res. 1145, 88th
Cong. 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REC. 18471, 18539 (1964).
7. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1967, at 11, col. 1.
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Richard Nixon, who asserted that his constitutional authority as Commander
in Chief gave him virtually unlimited discretion over the deployment of
United States troops.
8
In each of these cases, the United States faced the question of whether or
not to make war. In each case the nation's decision was affected by many
sweeping considerations: the deeper values and current views of the Presi-
dent; values and views of the Congress; the prevailing consensus in the coun-
try about the United States' role in international affairs in general; and the
merits of the specific case in question. In each case, the decision was also
importantly affected by the specific constitutional division of warmaking pow-
ers among politically responsible officials, as interpreted by practice, custom,
and associated law.
This essay focuses on the last cluster of factors: constitutional and legal
arrangements for warmaking. Our purpose is to examine these "constitu-
tional" issues in their concrete political dimensions: identifying effects of al-
ternative divisions of powers, responsibilities, and associated procedures on
probabilities of action, and exploring criteria for selecting a preferred division
of powers between the President and Congress on this vital issue. The War
Powers Resolution of 1973 serves as our central test case.
I
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
The United States Constitution is a product of the eighteenth century. Its
authors were men of the Enlightenment and also men of action: political
philosophers-mostly at secondhand-with firsthand practical experience.
They were intensely conscious of what we have called elsewhere the "paradox
of rulership."9 On the one hand, the common good required that political
power be placed in some human hands. Only by yielding considerable discre-
tion to a central public authority could citizens secure the common defense,
law, order, or personal liberties. But on the other hand, to establish a power-
ful public authority was to create enormous risks of the misuse of power. As
so often before, the rulers, being human and thus fallible, might choose un-
wisely, or might implement their choices clumsily, at awful cost. The framers
aimed at an effective central government, else they would not have come to
Philadelphia. But they sought to minimize the risks.
The product of their work had four distinctive features. One of these was
8. Nixon claimed that the "legal justification" for the invasion of Cambodia, for example, "is
the right of the President of the United States under the Constitution to protect the lives of
American men .... [A]s Commander in Chief, I had no choice but to act to defend those men."
R. NIXON, A NEw ROAD FOR AMERICA: MAJOR POLICY STATEMENTS, MARCH 1970-OCTOBER 1971,
675, 683 (1972).
9. The section that follows draws heavily on Allison & Neustadt, Afterword, in R. KENNEDY,
THIRTEEN DAYS; A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971).
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limited authority: the Federal Bill of Rights and its state counterparts were
meant to wall off civil liberties, including private property, from arbitrary
governmental action. A second feature was shared powers: federal and state
governments had overlapping functions, and within the federal structure, so
did the President, House of Representatives, Senate, and Supreme Court. A
third feature was separated institutions: each power-sharing body had a sepa-
rate base of political accountability, hence constituency, and these were kept
distinct from one another. A fourth feature was legitimation by the symbols
of popular sovereignty: the people replaced the monarch, and this was done
in such a way as to clothe institutions with their status, while yielding little to
direct democracy.
Throughout, the underlying theme was checks and balances; right hedg-
ing authority, powers checking powers, separate institutions in enforced col-
laboration, with political accountability divided and legitimacy dispersed. No
one man was entrusted with unlimited prerogatives; neither was the mob.
Instead, a goodly group of men, each with a piece of power, backed by a
constituency, would scrutinize each other, balancing each other, as they tried
to fit their pieces into governance. As Justice Brandeis noted:" '
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of
1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable
friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three
departments, to save people from autocracy.
Then as now, the ultimate expression of authority was war, to which this
general pattern was applied with special care. The model evidently was the
English royal prerogative as modified by Parliament's control over the purse.
The framers modified it further. Congress as a substitute for Parliament
would also declare war. The Senate as a parliamentary body was to share in
making treaties of alliance or of peace. Our President, as substitute for the
King, had no prerogative to do these things alone. What he retained, alone,
was actual command of such armed forces as congressional enactments gave
him leave to raise and keep. Mindful of the problems caused by the Continen-
tal Congress's attempts to direct the conduct of the Revolutionary War, the
framers sought to protect the President from such harassment. As Alexander
Hamilton explained, "[o]f all the cares or concerns of government, the direc-
tion of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the ex-
ercise of power by a single hand."i" But it was the intention of the framers
that recourse to war required a collaborative judgment by the whole body of
men in national elective office. Presidents could not declare war, congressmen
10. Meyers %. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 463 (Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton).
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could not deploy troops. On this as on all lesser issues, these men were to
check and balance one another.
Law must square with reality in order to be effective. Reality is inevitably
complex: What constitutes a "war" requiring congressional declaration or au-
thorization? The framers clearly intended that the President be empowered to
defend the United States against sudden attack. But the line between defense
and offense, never entirely clear at the outset of American history, grew in-
creasingly hazy as the nation's contacts with the outside world proliferated.
Virtually from the start of our development under the Constitution, presi-
dents have employed United States military forces abroad to protect our citi-
zens' lives, property, or other interests without declarations of war, and often
without congressional authorization. By various counts, there have been
perhaps as many as two hundred such incidents in United States history. 2
Moreover, of the conflicts known to us as "wars," three of the four most costly
in both lives and money-the Civil War, Korea, and Vietnam-have been un-
declared and waged largely on presidential authority, with Congress at best an
after-the-fact ratifier of presidential initiatives. Most of these incidents have
been small scale affairs, limited in duration, involving few, if any, United
States casualties. In many, prior consultation with Congress would have been
impractical or impossible, but, unfortunately, no sharp line divided such "in-
cidents" from major wars.
Moreover, the idea that small-scale uses of United States military force
(however defined) need no congressional authorization1 3 raises several trou-
blesome issues when one thinks about preferred constitutional and legal pro-
cesses for making decisions about war. The first is moral: Most of these ac-
tions have been directed against the "half-assed nations" of the world, as
Senator Goldwater uncharitably described Cambodia during the iMayvaguez
affair.1 4 But should the United States employ one allocation of warmaking
power in its relations with strong nations and quite another with weak ones? 5
12. E.g., the American Enterprise Institute's analysis of the War Powers Bill lists 161 such
incidents. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, THE WAR POWERS BILl., LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS
No. 19, at 47-55 (April 17, 1972). Similarly, J. Terry Emerson. counsel to Senator Barry Goldwa-
ter, counts 199, Ip to and including the Jordanian crisis of 1970, Hearings on S.440 Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 126-148 (1973) (War Powers Legislation).
Among the important were Polk's occupation of the Mexican border territory, Wilson's interven-
tions in Mexico and Siberia, and intervention in the Dominican Republic by no fewer than four
presidents.
13. See, e.g., Goldwater, The President's Ability to Protect American's Freedoms-The Warmaking
Power, 1971 LAW & SOCIAL ORDER 423.
14. TIME, May 26, 1975, at 18.
15. As Professor Henry Steele Commager pointedly asked during the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee's hearings on the War Powers Bill:
[.. lilt is a sobering fact that presidents do not rush in with the weapons of war to bring
Britain, France, Italy, Russia, or Japan to heel. Would we have bombarded Southampton
to collect a debt? Would we have sent an expedition into Rome to protect Americans
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The second issue is legal: If the President is empowered to use military force
where the costs, duration, and scope of the action are likely to be limited,
what legal restrictions are there on his authority in such cases? May a Presi-
dent legally occupy Botswana or Burundi merely because resistance is likely to
be slight? 6 That question leads to a third, more practical one: If the probable
cost of a potential military action is the principle that determines whether
congressional authorization is necessary, then how are those costs to be ascer-
tained beforehand? And, more to the point, who is to ascertain them? It is not
always clear just how extensive a military conflict will be before the first shots
are fired; in fact, it rarely is. Historically, governments have repeatedly em-
barked on "splendid little wars" only to have them turn into long, drawn-out
disasters. The Constitution rests on the assumption that collaborative judg-
ments of the President and Congress will, on the average, produce the most
accurate assessments of the probable costs of war and whether they are jus-
tified by the potential benefits. If the Congress cannot be persuaded that the
United States should engage in military or paramilitary operations in Angola,
for example, then one must presume on constitutional principles that it is in
fact not in the country's best interest to do so.
The applicability of the constitutional guidelines for the allocation of au-
thority over warmaking has been complicated by yet another factor, the so-
called "Lockean prerogative." Locke, the philosophical progenitor of the
United States Constitution and intellectual champion of limited government,
had acknowledged that in times of dire necessity "the laws themselves should
. . . give way to the executive power.. , This view of the necessity for
emergency powers was shared by all of the framers of our Constitution; even
Jefferson admitted that "[o]n great occasions every good officer must be
ready to risk himself in going beyond the strict line of the law, when the
public preservation requires it .... "" But while the framers agreed that crisis
situations might require that the customary checks upon executive effective-
ness be released, they were extremely uncomfortable with the idea, for they
against a threat from a fascist government? Would we have precipitated a war with Brit-
ain over a boundarv dispute in Maine? Would we land marines in France if customs
collectors did not behave themselves? Would we bomb Siberia for years if shots were
fired-without an\' hits-at an American vessel? And does it really comport with the
honor and dignity of a great nation to indtlge its Chief Executive in one standard of
conduct for the strong and another for the weak?
Hearings on S.731, S.J. Res. 18 and S.J. Res. 59 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1972).
16. As, for example, President Wilson occupied Haiti in 1915. That occupation, which lasted
until 1934, was formalized by a treaty ratified by the Senate in February 1916, but the first six
months of the occupation were conducted tinder presidential authority alone. Hearings on S. 440,
supra note 12. at 139.
17. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 81 (1966).
18. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W.C. Claiborne (Feb. 3, 1807), in THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 151 (Mem. ed. 1904).
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were only too aware of the danger that a temporary dictatorship might be-
come a permanent one. As the expanse of government power increased, so
did the danger of its abuse.
Lincoln gave us the clearest example of a President's exercise of such
emergency authority in our nation's history. Upon taking office in March
1861, he faced the country's gravest crisis. Congress was not in session and
was not scheduled to reconvene until the following December; Lincoln im-
mediately called for a special session. But he delayed the opening of that
session until July, giving him four months in which to act unilaterally to meet
the growing crisis. He ordered a blockade of southern ports, spent public
funds without congressional appropriation, expanded the Army and Navy,
suspended habeas corpus, and declared martial law throughout the land.
These actions, he told that special session of Congress, "whether strictly legal
or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand
and a public necessity; trusting then as now that Congress would readily ratify
them.' 9 And Congress did ratify them, retroactively authorizing all of his
unilateral initiatives. So, too, did the Supreme Court, although in a much
more limited way. In the Prize Cases, it upheld Lincoln's unilaterally imposed
blockade, finding that the outbreak of war had created a situation to which
the President was legally justified in responding "without waiting for Congress
to baptize it with a name."2"' Lincoln himself was uncertain of the legality or
constitutionality of his actions. At times he inclined to the view that, though
his actions might not be legal, the necessity of the situation justified them;
thus he vowed privately that "I will violate the Constitution, if necessary to
save the union . 2.. ,1 At other times he asserted that the very necessity
legalized those actions; "[M]easures, otherwise unconstitutional," he wrote,
"might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the
Constitution, through the preservation of the nation. '22 But whatever the le-
gality of his actions, there is no doubt that they were politically legitimate, at
least in retrospect, although controversial at the time. After his death, how-
ever, Congress reasserted its authority, and the nation entered a period of
"congressional government" that was to last until the end of the century. But
the questions raised by Lincoln's four years as President remained: What cir-
cumstances justified the exercise of such emergency presidential powers? And
who was to be the judge? Ultimately, these were political questions of the
highest order.
Numerous parallels have been drawn between the presidencies of Abra-
ham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy. Among the more intriguing is the force-
19. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 2, at 58.
20. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 669 (1863).
21. J. JAvITS, WHO MAKES WAR? 130 (1973).
22. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Albert Hodges (April 4, 1864), in THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 281 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
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ful action taken by each on thier own authority to meet grave military threats
to the nation. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy held the life of the
nation in his hands. He was assisted in his ordeal by some of the ablest men
of the day, but ultimately, the decision was his alone. Why did Kennedy hold
the decision so close to his own chest? The answer is not hard to find: the
need to preserve secrecy and flexibility of action, the uncertainty of Soviet
intentions, and the extreme complexity of the diplomatic and military man-
euvering, and, above all, time or the lack thereof. Taken collectively, these
constraints in time limited the circle of men with whom the constitutional
Commander in Chief would engage in meaningful consultation. To maximize
the prospect of a wise and viable choice, some interests could not be excluded.
In the missile crisis the issue was preeminently a matter of defense and dip-
lomacy; it depended throughout on the capability of our intelligence and
posed the possibility of military action. As constituted, ExCom assured rep-
resentation of these interests. Natural parochialism, stemming from the gov-
ernmental positions of these men, guaranteed that considerations of defense,
diplomacy, intelligence, and military action would be voiced. But, potentially,
the life of the nation was at stake. How was this interest represented? The
President himself represented the nation, with aides of his own choosing, not
least his brother, Robert F. Kennedy.
Time made the presidential mind the only source available from which to
draw politically legitimated judgments on what, broadly speaking, can be
termed the political feasibilities of contemplated action vis-a-vis our world an-
tagonists; judgments on where history was tending, what opponents could
stand, what friends would take, what officials would enforce, what men in the
street would tolerate-judgments on the balance of support, opposition, and
indifference, at home and abroad. As Richard E. Neustadt has observed,
"Technology has modified the Constitution: the President, perforce, becomes
the only man in the system capable of exercising judgment under the extra-
ordinary limits now imposed by secrecy, complexity, and time." In addition to
his traditional roles, the President has become, in Neustadt's terms, "the
nation's Final Arbiter.123
Where was Congress? What about those other minds legitimated by elec-
tion? They were out of play, except to have their leadership informed at the
last moment. Earlier consultation offered nothing indispensable. Congress, to
be sure, could add legitimacy, but of this the President conceived he had
enough. As a nationally elected officer he was, himself, more representative
than all of them together. Besides, command decisions rested constitutionally
with his office, not theirs. So he decided first and told them after.
Since the Soviet Union's entry into the nuclear club, the scenario of nu-
23. R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 212 (2d ed. 1968).
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clear confrontation has dominated most political thinking about the allocation
of warmaking authority between the President and Congress. Coupled with
the memory of the debilitating effects of congressional isolationism prior to
the Second World War, this has allowed postwar presidents a degree of free-
dom and autonomy over the disposition of United States military forces en-
joyed by few presidents before Franklin Roosevelt. Indeed, the belief in ex-
ecutive authority was so strong that when President Eisenhower asked for a
congressional resolution endorsing and authorizing whatever military action
he might order to defend Formosa, "Mr. Congress" Sam Rayburn feared
that the resolution might imply that Eisenhower did not already possess
such authority.
24
Eisenhower also used his executive authority to send several hundred
United States military advisers to assist the regime of President Ngo Dinh
Diem of South Vietnam; nobody challenged his right to do so. President
Kennedy vastly expanded the United States contingent there, and no one
questioned his authority either. But after Lyndon Johnson turned this com-
mitment into a full-scale war, the whole ideology of presidential prerogative
in military affairs came under increasingly bitter attack.
What Johnson did in Vietnam, he did on his own authority. After sharply
escalating the United States' role in the war in the first half of 1965, Johnson
could have asked Congress to ratify his policies and to authorize further op-
erations. Though there is little doubt that his request would have been
granted, Johnson refused to do so, perhaps fearing to acknowledge publicly
that the United States had entered into large-scale hostilities likely to last sev-
eral years. Johnson did, of course, have the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution in
his pocket. Formally, it was a sweeping affirmation of support for whatever
the President might choose to do in Southeast Asia; in it, Congress declared
that the United States was "prepared, as the President determines, to take all
necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or
protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense treaty requiring assis-
tance in defense of its freedom. '25 Politically, however, it was a flimsy shield.
As the scale and intensity of the war steadily expanded, it became increasingly
clear that-whatever the Resolution actually said-Congress had not intended
for it to be taken quite so literally. In considering it initially, the Senate had
rejected an amendment stating that Congress did not endorse "extension of
the present conflict"; this followed Senator Fulbright's assurance that such an
amendment was needless. 26 As the war progressed, or failed to, the legitimacy
of the Resolution as an expression of congressional sentiment faded.
Once the war had expanded, congressional disillusion was fueled by a feel-
24. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 2, at 161.
25. Act of Aug. 10, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384.
26. See 110 CONG. REC. 18459 (1964).
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ing of having been duped. Having never committed themselves to war in Viet-
nam, members of the Senate and House of Representatives felt free to attack
"Johnson's war." Attacks by Congressmen helped to legitimate dissent in the
country, encouraging others, especially universities and the media. Moreover,
the character of congressional criticism gave some credibility to charges that
the war was not only senseless and immoral, but also illegal, and therefore
illegitimate.
Vietnam's cost, both human and material, and its duration, coupled with
the absence of agreed success or even agreed purpose, aroused an opposed
perspective to the nuclear-inspired doctrine of presidential prerogative.
Through its long and painful history, Vietnam undermined the simple confi-
dence in each of the arguments that had traditionally supported congres-
sional deference to the President in the area of foreign affairs: unity, secrecy,
superior expertise, superior sources of information, decision, and dispatch.
Indeed, as the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s 27 sapped the self-confidence of
Congress about its role in foreign affairs, and discredited congressional con-
trol in the eyes of the public, so Vietnam, compounded by Watergate, may
have similar effects on the presidency for years to come.
The early 1970s, therefore, saw new impetus behind a search for a func-
tional equivalent of the Constitution's intent-namely, that the body of elected
men on Capitol Hill share in White House decisions at the time warfare be-
gins. The power of the purse evidently did not suffice: Witholding funds
from forces in the field proved not to be a practicable course for most elected
politicians. Congressional search, therefore, focused on ways of giving Con-
gress a voice before those forces got committed beyond recall. From this
search emerged the War Powers Resolution of 1973.28
II
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
The War Powers Resolution did not leap full-blown from any single mind.
Instead, Congress considered a number of alternative proposals of varying
scope and intensity for restoring the constitutional balance between Congress
and the presidency in warmaking. In the summer of 1973, with United States
forces finally withdrawn from Vietnam, each chamber approved its own ver-
sion of a war powers bill. The Senate bill was most notable in that it attempted
to define quite precisely the only circumstances in which a President would be
legally authorized to commit United States forces to hostilities in the absence
of a declaration of war. These circumstances were:
27. Act of Feb. 21, 1942, ch. 104, 56 Stat. 95; Act of Nov. 17, 1941, ch. 473, 55 Stat. 764; Act
of Aug. 27, 1940, ch. 695, 54 Stat. 866; Act of June 26, 1940, ch. 431, 54 Stat. 611; Act of Nov.
4, 1939, ch. 2, 54 Stat. 4; Act of May 1, 1937, ch. 146, 50 Stat. 121; Act of Aug. 31, 1935, ch.
837, 49 Stat. 1081 [all codified at scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.].
28. H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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(1) to repel, retaliate against, or forestall an armed attack on the United
States, its territories and possessions;
(2) to repel or forestall an attack on United States troops abroad;
(3) to protect while evacuating, under specific circumstances, United States
citizens and nationals whose lives are under direct and imminent threat;
or
(4) pursuant to specific statutory authorization.
The Senate bill also required that the war be terminated after thirty days
unless Congress voted to continue it, although it did allow the President an
additional thirty days to continue the war if "unavoidable military necessity"
forced him to do so.2
'
The House version contained no specific delineation of the contingencies
that would justify a presidential commitment of United States armed forces
into battle. Its time period was 120 days, but it did not allow for a thirty day
extension similar to the Senate's bill. It also attempted to strengthen congres-
sional control over the deployment of United States troops overseas, while
providing that Congress could terminate the war at any time by concurrent
resolution, not subject to veto. 3 '
The final version of the resolution, passed over the veto of President
Nixon on November 7, 1973, combined elements of both versions. The Sen-
ate's legally binding delineation of the only circumstances to which a President
could respond militarily was replaced by a general policy statement without
similar force. The President was required to report to Congress within forty-
eight hours of the initiation of hostilities on the causes for such action, and to
terminate United States involvement unless Congress approved the action
within sixty days (allowing him a final thirty day extension). Finally, the con-
ference version required that the President report to Congress on the prog-
ress of an undeclared war at least every six months, and that Congress vote to
continue or terminate the war within sixty days of each such report."
The War Powers Resolution naturally aroused a good deal of emotion,
both pro and con. President Nixon charged that it was "clearly unconstitu-
tional," and that it would "seriously undermine this nation's ability to act de-
cisively and convincingly in times of international crisis." 2 Gerald Ford com-
plained that it "has the potential for disaster. 3 3 Arguing against the bill from
the opposite perspective was Senator Eagleton, who believed that the Senate
version's legally binding delineation of the President's war powers was the
essence of the bill; he called the compromise version a "horrible mistake" that
would grant the President "unilateral authority to commit troops anywhere in
29. 119 CONG. REc. 25119-20 (1973).
30. Id. at 24655-708.
31. Act of Nov. 7, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 [codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp.
IV 1974)]. See also 119 CONG. REc. 33036-38 (1973).
32. NY. Times, Nov. 8, 1973, at 1, col. 8; id. at 20, col. 3.
33. Id. at 20, col. 3.
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the world for 60 to 90 days. '3 4 Similarly, Senator Abourezk decried it as "a
blank check which will implicate Congress in whatever aggressive warmaking
a President judges to be necessary."", On the other hand, Senator Javits, who
co-sponsored the Senate bill, claimed that "this is a very real, substantive
check upon the President so that he must, with any kind of practicality, seek
the concurrence of Congress in what we prescribe."36
Was the War Powers Resolution really "a turning point in the continuing
struggle to restore the American constitutional system of checks and bal-
ances," as the New York Times editorialized?3 1 Was it the "disaster" that Ford
predicted? Or was it a measure with a good deal less significance than both its
proponents and its detractors claimed?
III
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
On what basis is one to judge constitutional-legal arrangements for war-
making? Focusing specifically on the War Powers Resolution, how is one to
decide whether the arrangements it defines for warmaking are to be pre-
ferred to the arrangements that preceded passage of the bill, or to other al-
ternative arrangements-for example, a modern-day version of the Ludlow
Amendment3 I that would require a national referendum to declare war or to
engage in warfare overseas? Or to take a more current example, what are the
merits and possible effects of the proposal recently advanced by Senate aide
Michael J. Glennon to attach a statutory funding prohibition to the existing
War Powers Resolution in order to deny funding for any activities outside the
three conditions set forth in the Resolution's "Purpose and Policy" section?3 1
What about the resolution drafted by Senator Alan Cranston that would pro-
hibit the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States unless the Presi-
dent obtained the consent of a majority of a committee composed of the
Speaker of the House and the Minority Leader, the Majority and Minority
Leaders of the Senate, and the Chairmen and ranking minority members of
both Armed Services Committees, the Foreign and International Relations
34. Id.
35. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 2, at 304.
36. 31 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. at 2743 (1973).
37. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1973, at 46, col. 2.
38. 86 CONG. REC. App. 7058 (1940).
39. Glennon, Strengthing the War Powers Resolution: The Case for Purse-Strings Restrictions, 60
MINN. L. REV. 1, (1975). Section 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution states:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United
States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a
declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency
created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed
forces.
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Committees, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy?4"' And what might
be the effects of a bill passed early in 1975 by the Senate allowing the Presi-
dent to call up to 50 thousand reservists to active duty for up to ninety days,
without a declaration of war or national emergency? While procedures are far
from all important, they do have some effect. In trying to evaluate the War
Powers Resolution, it is necessary to weigh at least seven clusters of complex
considerations.
First, what is the prospect for "good" decisions on war, or the avoidance of
war, under the distribution of power and rules of the game envisaged by the
Resolution? Does it offer the highest probability among possible alternatives
for getting the nation into wars one prefers we enter, and keeping us out of
wars one prefers we avoid? Obviously, Americans differ on this issue, some
favoring World War II, Korea, and Vietnam alike, some wishing we had
stayed out of all three, and many drawing distinctions among them. It is well
to recall that in 1812, and again in 1898, Congress rather than the President
took the lead in forcing war upon the country. 4 1
Second, however one answers the first question "on the average," what
about the next case, say, in the Middle East? Under the War Powers Resolu-
tion, as compared to other possible alignments of power, what are the pros-
pects for "appropriate" choice? Again, there is obvious disagreement among
Americans on what may be appropriate.
Third, how does the Resolution fare as a mechanism for resolving differ-
ences among Americans over the decision to enter war? What are its pros-
pects for producing politically viable decisions about war? Is the process for
making such important decisions about issues on which the nation may be
sharply divided one that most citizens recognize as legitimate?
Fourth, what effects will the Resolution have on the conduct of any given
war the United States enters? Will strategy, tactics, and the overall administra-
tion of the war be affected by the provisions of the Resolution, and, if so,
how?
Fifth, how will the Resolution affect prospects for the termination of war?
How will it influence the United States negotiating position? What role will
Congress play in the war's conclusion?
Sixth, how will the Resolution affect the overall balance of power between
the President and Congress during wars or other military actions?
Finally, what of unintended side effects? These are the bane of constitu-
tional reforms adopted to keep some contemporary problem from ever occur-
ring again. The twentieth amendment is a classic case. In order to avoid for-
evermore the crisis that ensued in the four months from Franklin Roosevelt's
40. See FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT (1975) at 4.
41. J. JAVITS, supra note 21, at 56, 150.
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election to inaugural, we so shortened the learning time for presidents-elect
as to invite fiascos like the Bay of Pigs.
IV
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION IN PERSPECTIVE
The War Powers Resolution was intended to prevent "another Vietnam,"
at least to the extent that no future President would be able to exercise the
kind of unilateral authority that, it was claimed, Presidents Johnson and
Nixon had wielded during the course of American involvement in Indochina.
But what effect would it have had on United States policy during our last
Vietnam? "Historical replays" call for difficult judgments. As a point of de-
parture for broader argument, we offer our judgments-making explicit use
of the criteria just listed.
A. Effect on United States Entry into the War
Would the Resolution have prevented the massive Americanization of the
war that occurred in 1965? The answer is a clear no. Despite the popularity
of President Johnson's 1964 campaign pledge, that "American boys should
not do the fighting for Asian boys," most Americans supported the war effort
in 1965. Opposition was confined to relatively small segments of public and
congressional opinion, and it seems fairly certain that, if President Johnson
had reported to Congress as required by the Resolution shortly after the initi-
ation of sustained United States bombing of the North or the introduction of
regular United States combat troops in the South, Congress would have
speedily authorized a continuation of the war. (Indeed, as argued above, if he
had wanted a formal declaration of war, he would have gotten it.)
B. Effect on Consensus and Legitimacy
Assuming Johnson had eschewed a formal declaration of war, going the
War Powers Resolution route instead, repeated congressional authorizations
of the war, long after the Tonkin Gulf Resolution had ceased to command
any real respect, would certainly have served to legitimize the war and the
decision making process governing it. No longer would it have been so starkly
"Johnson's (or Nixon's) war"; Congress would have been on record as a will-
ing accomplice. But it is not at all clear how this process of semiannual
reauthorization of the war would have affected public opinion on this divisive
issue. On the one hand, with Congress officially "on board," an important
forum for legitimizing dissent on the war might have been denied antiwar
forces. Congressional complicity in the warmaking process might have stifled
congressional dissent; politicians are notoriously reluctant to admit publicly
that they have been wrong-repeatedly wrong-on an important issue. It is
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one thing for Senators and Congressmen to admit that they were wrong (or
had been deceived) five or six years ago; it is quite another to stand up and
say, "I was wrong on this six months ago. Now I'm going to vote differently."
Without the vigorous criticism that flowed through the halls of the Capitol, it
might have been possible for the administration to isolate dissenters from the
mainstream of public opinion, to brand them as unpatriotic extremists.
Yet, opposition to the war sprang far more from its frustrating failure
than from its apparent illegality, and it is doubtful that this dissent would
have been perpetually stifled by the knowledge that Congress had acquiesced
in the war's continuation. Indeed, the requirement that Congress periodically
renew its approval for the war might well have provided a focal point for
dissent on the war, a target at which antiwar groups could have directed their
efforts. These efforts, in addition to the counterefforts of the Administration
and its supporters, might have further polarized public opinion on the war
instead of creating a consensus.
C. Effect on the Conduct of the War
In a very real sense, the Vietnam war was fought out in America's living-
rooms. It was America's first televised war, probably the most intensively-
reported war in history. Above all, it was a struggle for the hearts and minds
of the people-the American people as well as the Vietnamese. Both sides
realized this and planned their strategies accordingly-the communists gam-
bling (successfully, as it turned out) that their staying-power would outweigh
American firepower, the Americans churning out reams of statistics purport-
ing to prove that we were somehow winning the war; body counts, targets
destroyed, and villages pacified. Rarely has "PR" been such an important
military weapon.
Had it been in effect, the War Powers Resolution could only have inten-
sified this "Madison Avenue" aspect of the conduct of the war. American
strategy in Vietnam was importantly affected by the presidential campaigns of
1964, 1968, and 1972. According to some reports, John Kennedy had hoped
to withdraw from Vietnam after the 1964 elections. When he became Presi-
dent, Lyndon Johnson postponed the sustained bombing of North Vietnam
until after he had been elected in his own right. In 1968, Johnson apparently
tried to boost the candidacy of Hubert Humphrey by ordering a complete
halt to the bombing of the North only a few days before the election. And in
1972, peace suddenly became "at hand" with the election only a few weeks
away. The War Powers Resolution would have forced the Administration into
tailoring its strategies more closely to the need to obtain congressional ap-
proval every six months. It thereby raises the issue of congressional interfer-
ence in the President's role as Commander in Chief. The Stennis hearings on
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the air war during the summer of 1967-which concluded with the ringing
declaration, "It is high time, we believe, to allow the military voice to be heard
in connection with the tactical details of military operations." 4 2-were at least
partially responsible for President Johnson's decision to further escalate the
bombing later that year. The Resolution's semiannual reauthorization process
might therefore have provided a lever for increased congressional influence
over United States tactics and strategy in Vietnam.
It also would have strengthened the argument of those who favored a
more rapid escalation of the war against the proponents of the "slow squeeze"
approach adopted in 1965. Time was an important factor in the war. In many
respects, the American strategy was one of buying time until the South Viet-
namese could "hack it." On the other hand, they could not rely on indefinite
public and congressional support for the war effort. A War Powers Resolu-
tion would have raised the specter that eventually Congress would refuse to
renew its authorization for the war in the absence of tangible results, thus
strengthening the hand of Administration hawks.
D. Effect on the War's Termination
It is interesting to speculate on just when the war would have ended if the
War Powers Resolution had been in effect. This would have depended upon
how the war had been conducted under the Resolution, the efficacy of the
Administration's salesmanship, the willingness or reluctance of Congressmen
to reverse their votes on the issue, the effectiveness of antiwar groups in per-
suading and/or electing Congressmen to vote against the war, and other in-
tangible factors that cannot be weighed with any precision. Yet, given the
rising tide of opposition to the war, especially after the Tet offensive of 1968,
it is at least arguable that at some point before January 1973, Congress would
have refused to renew its approval for the war. This is particularly true since
the Resolution would have conferred jurisdiction over the resolutions
reauthorizing the war to the Foreign Affairs 43 and Foreign Relations Commit-
tees, bodies that were notably more dovish than the Armed Services and Ap-
propriations Committees that handled the bulk of Vietnam-related legislation.
Had Congress actually gone so far as to declare war on North Vietnam in
1965, congressional approval would have been required for the peace agree-
ment that terminated that state of war. What would have happened if the
Paris agreement had come before the Senate as a treaty? Most likely, it would
have been speedily ratified-whatever misgivings individual Senators may
have had about the agreement would have been subordinated to their over-
whelming desire officially to end the war.
42. 4 THE PENTAGON PAPERS 204 (Gravel ed. 1971).
43. Now the International Relations Committee.
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E. Effect on Balance of Power Between the President
and Congress
A war President is a powerful President, and his powers do not stop at the
water's edge. Inevitably, the requirements of war enlarge his influence over
domestic policy, too. But if Congress is required to give its seal of approval to
the war, then those members of Congress who are able to deliver the votes
enjoy a potentially vast influence. A legislative leader as powerful as a
Rayburn or a Johnson might be able to trade his influence on a war authori-
zation for administration support on his own preferred policies in another
realm; an Albert or a Mansfield perhaps less so. Moreover, since the Resolu-
tion alters the structure of power within the Congress, providing additional
leverage to its more dovish members, the bargaining position of the Congress
as a whole may be strengthened. In any event, the need for a President, any
President, to bargain continually with Congress in order to gain approval for
"his" war may force him to make significant concessions on other fronts and
so reduce his unilateral authority.
F. Side Effects
The principal side effects of the War Powers Resolution on the Vietnam
War would seem to be those listed above: pressure for more rapid escalation,
effects on dissent from both hawks and doves, possible greater stagemanaging
of the war effort in order to win congressional approval. Most importantly,
though, the Resolution would have changed the political structure of the de-
bate on the war in this country. The war was a critical factor in presidential
politics every four years; and the Resolution would have greatly increased its
impact on congressional politics, too. With Congress voting up or down on
the war every six months, debate could only have been intensified. Vietnam
divided this country as no other issue has in recent memory; under the War
Powers Resolution, that fissure would have widened into a chasm.
V
SPECULATION ABOUT THE FUTURE
Turning from the recent past to the near future, it may be instructive to
speculate about the potential effects of the War Powers Resolution on the
decision making process in coming situations where the question of United
States military intervention arises. Our crystal ball is by no means clear, how-
ever, and the following possibilities suggest themselves only as elements of a
cloudy future.
One probable effect of the Resolution will be to widen the circle of presi-
dential assistants involved in a decision to use military force and to color the
bureaucratic politics from which the decision emerges. Not only national sec-
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urity advisors but also legislative aides, political advisors, and speechwriters
will have to be heard by a President contemplating military action because
they will be preparing his report to Congress. Moreover, these aides will have
grounds for opposing military action without appearing soft or disloyal: what-
ever the merits, if Congress cannot be persuaded, the viability of the venture
will be at risk. A second effect of the Resolution will be to force Congress to
act publicly whenever United States troops are engaged in hostilities that last
as long as sixty days. This necessity that Congress vote for or against continu-
ation of military action will frame a pervasive public debate about the
decision-in Congress, in the press, and on television-a debate whose focus
will be shaped by the deadline requiring congressional action within sixty
days. A third effect of the Resolution stems from its redistribution of influ-
ence within Congress-towards the Foreign Relations and International Rela-
tions Committees, who have primary jurisdiction under the Resolution. The
character of discussion and hearings in those committees and the nature of
resolutions they will report out will be predictably more dovish than anal-
ogous discussions and resolutions of committees that authorize and appropri-
ate funds for war. These three effects will create substantial incentives for a
President to engage in extensive consultation with Congress before commit-
ting United States troops to combat; indeed, if there existed a congressional
leadership capable of representing the institution and delivering their col-
leagues-a significant f-a President would have powerful incentives to en-
gage in meaningful consultation.
Several aspects of the President's response to these factors seem higher-
confidence bets. One is that future military actions will be stagemanaged to
the fullest extent possible so as to induce a favorable public and congressional
reaction. Mayaguez most likely provided a foretaste of things to come: The
good news was trumpeted loudly, while the bad news was dribbled out in
small doses; as a result, the Administration's performance was acclaimed a
great success, while in fact, in retrospect, it merits no such accolade. Another
is that when the President is contemplating military action, two types of milit-
ary operations will appear much more attractive than any other: those that
promise quick victory, within the sixty to ninety days of grace, and those that
can become national crusades. For the latter, he will be more likely to seek a
formal declaration of war-to avoid the need to return to Congress every six
months.
Perhaps the least certain element in assessing the likely impact of the War
Powers Resolution concerns the role of Congress: the extent to which Con-
gress will assert its own authority. To date, the record is ambiguous. On
the one hand, Congress's cut-off of funding for United States participation in
the Angolan conflict reflected a widespread fear of "another Vietnam," how-
ever remote. Yet Congress raised no protest to President Ford's evacuations
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of United States and foreign citizens from Phnom Penh and Saigon, and it
cheered his handling of the MaYaguez affair-despite the fact that these ac-
tions violated seven separate statutory provisions barring the use of funds
"to finance military or paramilitary operations by the United States in or over
Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia." 4 1
The Constitution is, in Professor Corwin's famous phrase, "an invitation to
struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy. '45 The War
Powers Resolution does not alter that basic fact of the political landscape. It
may serve as a potential weapon in that ongoing struggle, although for which
side is not entirely clear. But the overall "correlation of forces" will be deter-
mined by the deeper undercurrents of American political life, among them
the "lessons of history" as etched on the popular mind. Before Pearl Harbor,
what constrained Franklin Roosevelt was not only, or even mainly, words in
statutes, but rather the forbidding strength of isolationist convictions moving
millions of his fellow citizens. What fueled their convictions? A deeply held
impression that American involvement in the First World War had been a
needless waste, a plot for profit. After the war, the freedom, relatively speak-
ing, felt and asserted by successive Presidents reflected not only congressional
but also widespread press and public sentiment. What fueled this permissive-
ness? Above all "Munich" as remembered after victory in World War II. For
the foreseeable future, the watchword of American foreign policy will be
"avoiding another Vietnam." But whose version of the "lessons" of that
conflict will become the prevailing reality? It is an entirely open question, but
its answer will largely determine how the "balance" between the President and
Congress in warmaking will be struck.
44. The language is taken from section 30 of the Foreign Assistance Act of Dec. 17, 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-189, 87 Stat. 714 [codified at scattered sections of 22 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1974)]; cf.
Glennon, supro note 39, at 13.
45. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 200 (1940).
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